Network effects and spatial autoregression in mode choice models:  Three essays in urban transportation economics by Goetzke, Frank
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2006 
Network effects and spatial autoregression in mode choice 
models: Three essays in urban transportation economics 
Frank Goetzke 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Goetzke, Frank, "Network effects and spatial autoregression in mode choice models: Three essays in 
urban transportation economics" (2006). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 2497. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/2497 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
Network Effects and Spatial Autoregression in Mode Choice Models: 






Dissertation submitted to the 
College of Business and Economics 
at the West Virginia University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 








David R. Martinelli, Ph.D., Chair 
Brian J. Cushing, Ph.D. 
Stratford M. Douglas, Ph.D. 
Randall W. Jackson, Ph.D. 
Jerald J. Fletcher, Ph.D. 
Santiago M. Pinto, Ph. D. 
 
 
Division of Economics and Finance 
 
 






Keywords:  Transportation Economics, Network Externalities, Neighborhood 
Effects, Mode Choice Model, Spatial Econometrics 
 
 




Network Effects and Spatial Autoregression in Mode Choice Models: 





Network analysis in transportation economics has traditionally focused on congestion as 
a negative externality stemming from supply-side capacity constraints. In my first paper paper, an 
analytical mode choice model is developed to examine the demand-side network effects. The 
assumption behind the approach is that, because of social network effects, the utility of people 
taking the mode increases with its mode share. It is found that social network effects change the 
modal aggregate demand curve for the mode to an inverted u-shape. This result has far-reaching 
policy consequences, since multiple equilibria become a possibility, causing positive externalities 
and path-dependency.  
 Transportation planners have always been aware of positive network effects in public 
transit use, which can be attributed to the fact that people choose transit, because other people 
already take it. In my second essay, I employ a spatially autoregressive mode choice mode to 
econometrically test for the existence of social network effects. It is found that the coefficient 
estimate for transit use network effects is positive and significantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, if social network effects are not included, it can be shown that an omitted variable 
bias is introduced into the model, which can lead to a systematic error in travel forecasts. 
 The third essay explains municipal differences in bicycle mode share with social network 
effects. Using data from the nation-wide travel behaviour survey, Mobility in Germany 2002, a 
binary logistic regression model was developed to identify in how much a city-specific “biking 
culture” has an impact on the city’s bike modal split. To avoid endogeneity of the biking culture 
variable, a social network effects instrument was developed. It was found that not only bicycle 
infrastructure, but also social network effects change municipal bike mode share. Further results 
were that work/educational and leisure trips depend less on social network effects than other trip 
purposes. The outcome of this research has significant policy implications, such as, that 
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 During the last decade it became more acceptable to analyze 
sociological topics with economic tools. In the field of social interactions, 
economists began looking at herd behavior, cultural conventions, foreign 
language learning, gift giving and fashion. The concepts of social network or 
spillover effects are the centerpiece of all these works. 
 What are social network effects? Very simply defined, social network 
effects exist if people prefer to do what other people already do. One reason for 
this behavior is that what other people do is viewed as an information signal. A 
person could believe that if someone else does a certain activity, this someone 
else may have additional information about this activity. For example, if a 
restaurant is crowded, people think is must be a good place to eat. Fashion or 
peer pressure are different interpretations of network effects. 
If a person prefers to walk, bicycle or use public transit as long he or 
she sees other people using the same mode, then the concept of social network 
effects also applies to transportation mode choice. In the transportation context, 
social network effects can arise due to an externality, where the central issue 
becomes a coordination problem. For example, while all members of a group 
together would benefit by riding transit, if nobody is willing to take the first 
step in using it the pay-off goes uncollected. 
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 Until recently nobody had applied these ideas towards transportation 
mode choice modeling. Transportation planners were always aware of social 
network effects. They knew that pedestrians like busy sidewalks, or people 
prefer biking when they see other bicyclists. Even more, they understood that if 
a transit system loses enough riders, it may easily collapse. The lack of these 
demand-side network research in the area of transportation is especially 
astonishing because supply-side network externalities, such as congestions, 
were one of the major issues transportation science dealt with during the last 
half century. 
 In the last few years, mainly two groups of authors, Antonio Páez and 
Darren Scott at McMaster University in Canada, as well as Joan Walker at 
Boston University and Elenna Dugundji at the University of Amsterdam in the 
Netherlands, have worked on very similar questions. All of them developed 
approaches to integrate demand-side network effects into their empirical travel 
behavior models. 
 However, my dissertation differs from the above research in three 
significant ways: First, I have developed a theoretical framework to evaluate 
social network effects as an externality problem and discuss their 
consequences. I found that social network effects in transportation mode choice 
modeling can lead to multiple equilibria of this transportation mode, and, 
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therefore, this transportation mode share would be path-dependent. The policy 
implications are far-reaching, since modal split, such as walking in American 
cities, results from potentially irreversible historical events. 
 Second, I model empirically the social network effects as a spatial 
autoregressive process, rather than using a simple zonal mode share mean. My 
approach of a spatially weighted modal split moving average is not only more 
realistic, it also takes care of the endogeneity problem of the network variable. 
Spatial data, however, is not always available. In these cases I find an 
instrument for the social network effects. 
 Third, my research has a strong focus on policy matters. My major 
contribution lies in making the transportation planning community aware of the 
consequences of social network effects. Since ignoring network externalities 
may lead to ill-informed decision making, I conclude all three essays with a 
policy discussion that focuses on the relevance of my findings. 
 The dissertation comprises three essays, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4. In the next chapter, I lay out a theoretical framework for mode choice 
decision making that includes social network effects. Starting off with an 
analytical model, I find that social network effects may lead to multiple mode 
share equilibria causing path-dependency. This means that a city’s actual 
modal split (of e.g. pedestrians, bicyclists or transit riders) may follow unique 
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historical events, and may be irreversible. A discussion of the welfare 
implications shows that only the equilibrium with the highest level of the mode 
share is welfare maximizing. 
 After generalizing the one-mode model to a two-mode model, I extend 
the basic model to include congestion either on the mode exposed to social 
network effects, or the alternate mode. I find that, for congestion on the 
network-exposed mode, a congestion charge is not necessarily welfare 
maximizing. Furthermore, if the alternate mode (e.g. automobile) is congested, 
the externality of the network-exposed mode (e.g. transit) could be easier to 
overcome. The results shed new light on the post-World War II transit 
ridership collapse in the United States. 
 Based on the New York City household travel dataset, I then develop in 
Chapter 3 a mode choice model to evaluate the presence of social network 
effects in public transit use.  Social network effects are modeled as a spatially 
autoregressive transit mode share process. The regression coefficient estimates 
for the social network effects variable were positive and significantly different 
from zero at the 5-percent level. I also show that, if the mode choice model 
does not account for social network effects, the estimates of the regression 
coefficients exhibit an omitted variable bias. The consequences discussed in 
the conclusion of the chapter are the following: Transit ridership is 
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overestimated for trips going from the suburbs into the CBD, while it is 
underestimated for trips within the central city. This systematic bias in the 
model can become the cause for poor decision making by transportation 
planners. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4 I analyze following the concept of social network 
effects, municipal bicycle mode share differences in German cities. The new 
idea is that a person’s decision to ride the bike depends also on the biking 
city’s culture in which he or she lives. Using a national travel behavior dataset, 
I build a binary logistic regression model to model bicycle mode choice as a 
function of personal, trip and city-specific variables, plus social network 
effects. 
I employed a city-level instrumental variable, based on the bike mode 
share of some excluded records (by trip purpose), and found that the regression 
coefficient estimates were positive in all cases, as well as significantly different 
from zero at the 5-percent level. The impact of two different bicycle 
infrastructure proxies was found to be positive, as well. With this empirical 
evidence of bicycle mode choice decision making depending on social network 
effects, transportation planners may focus not only on infrastructure 
improvements, but also on strengthening the city’s biking culture.  
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In Chapter 5, I finish up with a brief conclusion, summarizing all the 
results and giving an outlook onto further research in the field of network 























Mode Choice and Social Networks: 











Ever since the publication of Studies in the Economics of 
Transportation (Beckmann, McGuire and Winston, 1956), network analysis in 
transportation economics has centered on congestion as a negative externality. 
The foundation of this research is the limited capacity of the physical 
transportation network.1 This paper builds upon and extends this approach by 
also examining the positive network externalities stemming from the social 
networks of people choosing certain transportation modes, namely walking, 
bicycling and public transit. While traditional analysis is based on network 
effects in the supply of transportation, my focus is on network effects in 
transportation demand. The idea behind this new concept is simple: For some 
transportation modes, such as walking, bicycling, or transit use, the 
willingness-to-pay for people considering this mode increases with the number 
of other people already taking the same mode. This seems counterintuitive in 
the context of capacity constraints for transportation networks, since 
traditionally an additional person on the same network link is thought as 
imposing a congestion externality on everyone else already using the link. 
While it is possible to include capacity constraints and congestion in my 
argument, I did so only in the very last section of this paper, because for 
                                                 
1 For a survey on network analysis in transportation and beyond see Nagurney (2003). 
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walking, bicycling and public transit the maximum capacity is typically very 
high and rarely reached – a large city, such as New York, may be an exception.  
Why do people prefer to walk, bike, or use public transit together with 
others? The motivations can be grouped into three categories: The first 
category is a utility gain through the network effects coming from some kind of 
complementarity, since people are not alone, can meet other people, 
communicate with them, and feel safer. The second category is based on 
conformity and can be described as avoiding a utility loss by not following 
others because of the social norm, peer pressure and/or fashion. And in the last 
category, the utility improvement stems from internalizing an information 
externality, because people using a certain transportation mode (i.e. public 
transit) send a signal to everyone else that this is a feasible mode (public transit 
is reliable and, therefore, works)2. 
Including these social networks in mode choice decision-making is just 
an additional aspect of current network analysis in transportation. I am not 
claiming that these effects are more or less important than congestion. 
However, this minor extension of accounting for positive network effects, even 
if not given much weight, alters the result rather significantly. 
                                                 
2 This is similar to choosing a restaurant because its popularity is interpreted as a sign of 
quality. 
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Traditional economic reasoning assumes a downward sloping aggregate 
transportation demand curve; however, I will show that, if network effects exist 
in the mode choice decision, the demand curve changes to an inverted u-shape. 
This fact leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria, which has far-reaching 
consequences. First, a critical mass of users is necessary to make a 
transportation mode feasible or a transportation facility utilized. Second, this 
critical mass requirement may lead to local clusters of a specific transportation 
mode, which means mode choice decisions become spatially autoregressive. 
And third, potential multiple equilibria would make the actual mode share 
outcome path-dependent and, thus, a result of unique historical events. All 
three consequences are observable in real mode choices decisions, such as 
walking, bicycling, and transit use, and have important policy implications to 
be discussed in the conclusion. 
While these insights are commonly known in the economics of network 
industries (Economides, 1996; Rohlfs, 1974; Shy, 2001), they have not been 
appropriately applied in the context of transportation networks. Yevdokimov 
(2001 and 2002) incorporated demand-side network effects in his general 
equilibrium model of optimal highway investment, but he did not theoretically 
justify its use or further develop the concept. Goodwin et. al. (2005) mention 
demand-side network effects for transit users in their microeconomics textbook 
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without further developing the argument. Also, there is an emerging literature 
that finds econometric evidence of demand-side network effects in mode 
choice decision making (Dungundij and Walker, 2006; Goetzke, 2006), or 
simulates network effects in travel behavior (Páez and Scott, 2005; 2006). This 
literature, however, does not discuss the phenomena using an analytical model 
derived from economic theory as presented in this paper. Of course, there is 
also a body of economics literature concerning herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992), 
as well as social interaction (Akerlof, 1997), elaborating on externalities and 
multiple equilibria, but they do not explicitly deal with transportation mode 
choice decision-making. 
In the next section, I will introduce the basic mode choice model, 
consisting of one transportation mode. Then, I will relax some of the 
restrictions for the one-mode model and develop a general form of the basic 
model, which will be used for the social welfare discussion in the following 
section. In the next section, the model will be extended to two modes, before 
finally congestion is added to the model. I finish with a conclusion. 
 
THE BASIC MODEL 
Loosely following the pioneering paper by Rohlfs (1974), where he 
analyzes the demand structure of telecommunication services in the presence of 
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network externalities, I will present a static partial equilibrium model, where 
the marginal cost of using the transportation mode is exogenously determined. 
The basic model includes positive network externalities, but not congestion (a 
negative network externality) and allows a person to either use a certain 
transportation mode for the trip or not do the trip at all. The assumption is that 
all people are homogeneous in every aspect, except for their preference for 
choosing the mode together with others and they all face the same marginal 
cost using this mode. 
Before delving too deeply into the theoretical aggregate model, I want 
to first discuss graphically the impact of a positive network effect on the 
demand curve of an individual person choosing to walk. As seen in Figure 
2.1(a), the downward-sloping walking demand curve shifts up with a higher 
pedestrian mode share, which means that at the same level of walking 
consumption, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for walking increases. Figure 
2.1(b) exhibits the resulting upward sloping curve of WTP for one walking trip 
with respect to pedestrian mode share, which is a good starting point for 
introducing the basic model. 
 
Figure 2.1 about here 
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Consider now a group of n people choosing to undertake a non-
essential trip where the only possible transportation mode is walking3. 
Assuming a mode preference for walking with others of mx ≥ 04, the utility Ux 
for a specific person x taking this walking trip is defined as follows: 
 mx se –  p  if the person walks and 
 Ux =         (1) 
0                               if the person does not walk. 
The first term in Equation (1), which is the product of the personal mode 
preference for walking with others, mx, and the expected pedestrian mode share 
se ≥ 0, represents the network effect. The second part of the equation, p ≥ 0, 
denotes the full cost of walking. Since a low preference to use the modes with 
others, mx, will result in a value closer to zero, it can be easily seen that this 
leads to the cost of walking becoming more dominant when compared to the 
network effect. However, as the mode preference grows stronger, the walking 
cost term will lose its relative importance. 
Now I can analyze a specific person x’ who is indifferent about walking 
or not walking. This would be the case as long as: 
mx’ se –  p = 0 
                                                 
3 The assumption of a single transportation mode, such as walking, simplifies the analysis for 
better understanding. A later extension of the model will add more realism by allowing an 
alternative mode. 
4 If mx < 0, then the person dislikes walking with others, which would be a congestion case. 
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   p = mx’ se       (2) 
Equation (2) resembles exactly the network effect for an individual person as 
seen in Figure 2.1(b). The larger the preference to use the mode with others, 
mx’, the steeper the slope of the WTP curve in the graph and the more 
pronounced the network effect. A walking preference of zero would cause a 
horizontal WTP curve and a walking preference of infinity, a vertical WTP 
curve. 
 In order to derive the aggregate demand curve, I first need to determine 
the distribution for the preference to use the mode with others, mx, over all n 
people. The simplest case would be a uniform distribution for mx, which is 
defined as a linear equation, where person x is mapped to the preference for 
using the mode with others, mx, as follows: 
mx = M –  M/n x       (3) 
M is the maximum value for mx and n is the number of people potentially 
walking. In this set-up, the first person on the left of the x-axis has the highest 
preference to walk with others, while the last person on the right side of the x-
axis has the lowest preference to walk with others (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2 about here 
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 In order to derive the aggregate demand curve, I have to use Equation 
(3) for a specific person x’ in Equation (2): 
 p = mx’ se
 p = (M –  M/n x’) se       (4) 
In Equation (4), I know that while person x’ is indifferent towards walking, all 
people indexed as x < x’ become definitely pedestrians, since their preference 
for walking with others is higher than for person x’. Therefore, assuming 
perfect foresight, I can simply say that the expected pedestrian mode share is 
equal to the number of actual pedestrians: 
 se = 1/n x’        (5) 
The inverse aggregate demand function for walking can now be derived by 
substituting Equation (5) into Equation (4). I also want to normalize x’ to the 
pedestrian share s = x/n : 
 
 p = (M – M/n x’) 1/n x’ 
 p = (s – s2) M        (6) 
 
The aggregate demand curve, as seen in Figure 2.3, has an inverted u-
shape, is upward sloping at low levels of walking and becomes downward 
sloping after reaching the maximum WTP of ¼M at a pedestrian mode share of 
1/2. This means that as long as the mode share is less than 1/2 the WTP for 
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walking increases with every additional pedestrian, which is a result of the 
positive network externality. Assuming constant returns to scale, a horizontal 
marginal cost curve can be added to Figure 2.3. The level of the marginal cost 
curve (MC) will be determined by travel time, the quality of the walking 
facilities (the higher the quality, the lower the cost), and other factors of 
convenience, such as weather and/or aesthetics. 
 
Figure 2.3 about here 
 
As long the marginal cost is above the maximum WTP (MC > ¼M), 
such as in the example of p1, the mode share will be zero (s1), as seen in point 
A in Figure 2.3. However, if the marginal cost drops below ¼M, p2 will 
intersect three times with the demand curve, leading to two stable outcomes (B 
and D), as well as to one unstable outcome (C) according to the phase diagram. 
With outcome B, there are still no pedestrians, but if outcome D is achieved, 
the mode share for walking will be s2. The existence of two stable equilibria 
can result in two similar walking facilities with the same marginal cost, while 
facing the same aggregate demand curve can potentially have two different 
levels of utilization, one at zero and the other significantly above. 
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THE GENERAL FORM OF THE BASIC MODEL 
The basic model above has quite a few restrictions that I want to relax 
now. The major restriction is the uniformly distributed network preference. The 
question is whether or not the inverted u-shape of the aggregate demand curve 
holds also for skewed mode preference distributions. To discuss the cases of a 
larger number of people having a high or low preference for walking with 
others, I can formulate the following general equation for the network 
preference distribution: 
 mx = [1 – ( x/n)a] M, with a≥ 0     (7) 
The basic model discussed in the section above exists for a =1. If a > 1, 
however, then there are more people with high preferences to walk with others, 
while as long as 0 < a < 1, there are more people with low preferences to walk 
with others. Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (2) and normalizing for 
pedestrian share using Equation (5), I can find the following aggregate demand 
function: 
 p = (s – sa+1) M       (8) 
The characteristic of an inverted u-shape does not change with this addition, 
but the peak moves to the right of the center (pedestrian share equals ½) for a 
> 1, and to the left for 0 < a < 1. If a = 0, which identifies the case where 
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everybody has the same preference to walk with others at M, the inverted u-
shaped aggregate demand curve flattens to a horizontal line at the level of M. 
So far, I have assumed that people are not willing to pay for walking 
independently of the positive network effect. If I relax this assumption, another 
term, bx ≥ 0, can be added to Equation (1), which could be seen as a parameter 
of a personal preference for walking. If aggregated, the functional form of b(x) 
depends on the distribution of bx over all potential pedestrians, which, in this 
context, I do not need to restrict with any assumptions. Therefore, the general 
form of the aggregate demand curve is now: 
p = (s – sa+1) M + b(x)      (9) 
What the minimum WTP for walking independent of others, bx, does, is 
shifting the individual WTP curve up by its value with respect to pedestrian 
mode share. Now it is possible to derive the traditionally downward sloping 
aggregate demand curve by assuming that all people have the same preference 
of walking with others of 0, but they also have a decreasing WTP, which is 
independent of others as well as uniformly distributed between B and 0. This 
would result in the aggregate demand curve starting on the left at the value of B 
for a pedestrian share of 0 and ending on the right at the value of 0 for a 
pedestrian share of 1. By combining different preferences for walking with 
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others, mx, and different WTP for walking independent of others, bx, I can 
derive the aggregate demand curve seen in Figure 2.4. 
 
 Figure 2.4 about here 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the individual demand curves with respect to the 
pedestrian mode share based on their individual combinations of network and 
personal walking preferences: The first person on the far left has a personal 
walking preference of B3, but does not care about walking with others (no 
network effects). Moving from left to right, the next person has a personal 
walking preference of B2 and a network preference equal to the slope of her 
individual demand curve. The following person has the same personal walking 
preference as the person before, but, again, her network preference is equal to 
0. The next person (in the middle) has a personal preference of 0, but now the 
network preference is the same as the one of the second person (same slope of 
the demand curve). The next person has again the same personal walking 
preference of 0, but a lower network preference than the previous person 
(lower slope). Finally, the two following people have both the same network 
preferences (parallel demand curves), however, the very last person, on the far 
right, has a personal walking preference of 0, while the person before has a 
 20
personal walking preference of B1. If all the individual demand curves are 
combined, an aggregate demand curve can be derived, such as exhibited in 
Figure 2.4. With increasing pedestrian mode share, which means moving in the 
graph from left to right, the highest WTP value is selected for each level of 
pedestrian mode share, to derive the aggregate demand curve. 
Finally, I have to relax the assumption of mx being a real number. As 
long as I have people who always walk independent of others, I have to allow 
mx to become infinity. The result would be a vertical, inelastic aggregate 
demand curve. In Figure 2.5, I have combined all possible cases (discussed 
above) into a more realistic aggregate demand curve. On the far left I start with 
a share of s1 people having a preference value of walking with others of 
infinity, then, still on the left, I continue with a group having high values of mx, 
where the change of the minimum WTP, bx, is more dominant than the network 
effect (until s2), followed by a group to the right, where the network effect 
dominates the change of b (s3), and finish on the far right with a group of 
people having a preference to walk with others of 0 and a decreasing value of 
bx. 
 
Figure 2.5 about here 
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SOCIAL WELFARE DISCUSSION 
 In order to be able to decide which of the two stable equilibria is 
welfare maximizing, I have to evaluate Equation (4) and (8) assuming that the 
expected pedestrian mode share is the actual pedestrian mode share s*. Since 
all pedestrians with a larger value for their preference to use the mode with 
others (on the left of s*) also have a higher WTP then the actual cost at s*, 
there will be a consumer surplus. In order to derive the consumer surplus, I 
need to find the aggregate demand curve at the fixed level of se = s*. To 
simplify the exercise, I assume that b(x) is equal to 0: 
 p = (M – M sa) se
 p = M s*  – (M s*) sa       (10) 
As seen in Figure 2.5, the aggregate demand curve at the actual level of 
pedestrian share s* is classically downward sloping and intersects with the 
inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve at the point s* = s1. In the graph I 
assume that the walking preference parameter bx is the same for everyone at a 
level of B. 
Using Equation (10), the consumer surplus for the stable right-hand, 
non-zero equilibrium outcome at s* can be estimated as follows: 
 CS = 0∫s* [M s* – (M s*) sa] ds 
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      = ½ M S* – (1/a+1) M (s*)a+2 + k         
       = M s*2 (½ – 1/a+1 s*a) + k ≥ 0 for ½ ≤ s* ≤ 1 and a ≥ 1  (11) 
The constant of integration is k. Assuming that there is no producer surplus, the 
right-hand stable equilibrium with a pedestrian mode share of s1 ≥ ½ (point B) 
must be the welfare maximizing outcome (CS ≥ 0), because the consumer 
surplus will be always greater then for a pedestrian share of 0 (point A), where 
the consumer surplus is just zero. 
 
 Figure 2.6 about here 
 
However, the actual mode share outcome is path-dependent. Therefore 
the welfare maximizing result is not guaranteed. This can typically be seen in 
new pedestrian infrastructure investments, which indeed decrease the marginal 
cost of walking without necessarily increasing its usage. In order to take 
advantage of the positive network effects, a subsidy may be needed, at least in 
theory, ideally paid to the people with the highest preference to walk with 
others. Then the zero-equilibrium will move towards the welfare maximizing 
equilibrium. In practice, this subsidy could be an informational advertisement 
campaign or consist of other kinds of promotions for the new infrastructure, 
such as group walks, which first convinces people with a large value for their 
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preference to walk with others to use the new infrastructure. Then other 
pedestrians should follow as soon as the critical mass is passed.5 In the context 
of transit, a monthly pass may also make the people with the highest network 
preference willing to start using the bus, with the result that others may follow. 
In summary, it can be said, since the inverted u-shaped aggregate 
demand curve exhibits positive network effects causing changing WTP curves 
for each pedestrian mode share level, that the area underneath the demand 
curve is not equal to the consumer surplus. 
 
THE TWO-MODE MODEL 
Most transportation mode choice decisions involve at least two 
alternatives, such as public transit and the automobile. This extended model 
will therefore account for two modes, one with positive network externalities 
(public transit) and one without any network externalities. The change is 
conceptually easy to include into the general form of the basic model. All 
previous assumptions remain, except now everyone has to undertake the trip 
with one of both transportation modes. Therefore, nobody can choose to not 
take the trip at all: 
                                                 
5 To refer back to the previously mentioned restaurant example, the first few customers receive 
a free meal or discount, is a typical approach use by restaurants to take advantage of the 
positive network effects. 
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 mx se –  p + bx  if the person uses transit and 
 Ux =          (12) 
                        – c + dx   if the person takes the car 
In Equation (12), p ≥ 0 is the full cost for using transit, which is the fare, but 
could also include the travel time as well as the mode’s disamenities. The full 
cost of driving a car (operation, parking and travel time) is represented by c, 
while dx ≥ 0 is the individual WTP for driving the car, again a parameter of 
personal preference for driving6. After manipulating Equation (12), not 
assuming a functional form for the distribution of dx, it can be shown that the 
aggregate demand curve just shifts upwards by the amount of the automobile 
cost [c – d(x)], while all previously discussed characteristics remain, including 
the potential for multiple equilibria: 
p = (s – sa+1) M + b(s) + [c – d(x)]     (13) 
As soon as the cost of the alternative mode to transit, automobile cost, 
c, decreases, the inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve shifts down as 
expected with the result of a lower transit share. This means, because of the 
inverted u-shape characteristics of the aggregate demand curve that transit 
could lose its critical mass of users. Transit mode share would collapse from  s1 
to s2 with the decrease of the automobile operating cost from d1 to d2 (see 
                                                 
6 In the context of the individual WTP curve p = mx se + bx + c – dx, the term (bx – dx) becomes 
the personal preference for walking relative to driving. 
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Figure 2.7). Therefore, positive network effects may provide a good 
explanation for what has happened to the public transit mode share between the 
end of World War II, 1945, and the first Oil Crisis, 1975. During this time 
transit ridership declined in the United States at a very rapid rate as a result of 
increased access to cars and lower automobile operation costs (APTA, 1995; 
Clair, 1981).  When using my explaination, however, I do not have to assume a 
change in the preferences towards either public transit or the automobile, 
represented in the WTP b(s) and d(s), respectively. Nor do I even have to 
assume a lower quality of transit service, which would result in an upward shift 
of the marginal cost curve, p, as is common in the conspiracy theories 
surrounding this issue (Slater, 1997). Both an additional change of individual 
preferences away from public transportation and towards the car, as well as a 
lower transit service quality, would further accelerate the described process. 
 
 Figure 2.7 about here      
 
ADDING CONGESTION TO THE MODEL 
 At last, I want to add congestion to the models discussed above. There 
are two possible cases to consider: The first case is where marginal social cost 
for the transportation mode exhibiting positive network effects is greater than 
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its marginal private cost. The question in this context is if a congestion toll 
equal to the externality is efficient as is the case without the network effects. In 
the second case, I want to discuss consequences in the aggregate demand curve 
when the alternative mode is congested. 
 Using the basic model in its general form, I now assume that the 
walking facility can get congested, which means that with a higher pedestrian 
share it is slower to walk because of crowding. Assuming that the congestion 
cost is equal for everyone, I can subtract a congestion term f(s) from Equation 
(8), which is a positive function of the pedestrian share. After again 
manipulating the equation as previously done, the following aggregate demand 
function can be found: 
 p = (s – sa+1) M + bx – f(s)      (14) 
In equation (14) the WTP for walking falls at the rate of increasing congestion 
cost, with the result that the inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve pivots 
around the origin down to the left and gets compressed to scale. As seen in 
Figure 2.8, this leads to a flatter inverted u-shape of the aggregate demand 
curve, as well as one which intersects with the x-axis before the pedestrian 
share reaches the value of one. Since the supply curve representing the cost of 
walking did stay the same, the change could lead to a zero mode share 
equilibrium because the WTP for walking is at all points less than the cost. 
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 Figure 2.8 about here 
 
So far the analysis has only taken into account that an additional 
pedestrian faces a higher cost of walking. However, to complete the picture, 
this pedestrian also imposes a congestion externality on all already existing 
pedestrians. The traditional approach for internalizing this congestion cost on 
others is to charge a toll in the amount of this congestion externality. But with 
positive network effects, there may be cases where a congestion toll may not be 
welfare maximizing. To see that, consider again Equation (14). A congestion 
toll of t(s) would further decrease the willingness to pay (the inverted u-shape 
becomes even more flat) with the possible consequence of moving a stable 
right-hand equilibrium with a positive pedestrian share to a zero equilibrium. If 
that happens, it can be stated that as long as the consumer surplus of the 
equilibrium without the congestion toll minus the total external cost from the 
congestion is greater than zero, not charging a congestion toll is welfare 
maximizing, since the alternative is a consumer surplus of zero.  
It is possible that a congestion toll may not be welfare maximizing even 
if the congestion toll does not lead to a zero mode share equilibrium, because 
the aggregate demand curve at a fixed level of pedestrian share is changing 
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with the actual pedestrian share (see again Figure 2.6). Therefore, it can happen 
that the consumer surplus of the equilibrium without the congestion toll minus 
the total cost from the congestion is still greater than the consumer surplus of 
the equilibrium with congestion cost. This result stems from the fact that the 
positive network effect is an external benefit, counteracting the effect coming 
from the congestion externality. 
In summary, it can be said that as long as the externality caused by the 
positive network effect cannot be internalized, as it would be typically the case 
in the real, second-best world, a congestion toll can turn out to be economically 
inefficient. Since the finding also holds for the two-mode model, it is especially 
important to stress in the context of congested transit systems that instituting a 
congestion-based fare system could lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Now I want to evaluate congestion cost occurring in the alternative 
mode of a two-mode model. Using transit as the mode with positive network 
effects and the automobile as the alternative transportation mode, a negative 
congestion term, g(1 – s), which is a positive function of how many do not use 
transit (1 – s), needs to be added to the automobile cost, so that Equation (13) 
changes as follows: 
p = (s – sa+1) M + [b(s) – d(s)] + [c + g(1 – s)]   
   
   = (s – sa+1) M + [b(s) – d(s)] + [c – g(s)]    (15) 
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Interpreting Equation (15), in Figure 2.9 it can be seen that the congestion term 
pivots the aggregate transit demand curve up to the right around the point 
where the transit share is 1, and, therefore, increases the WTP for transit at the 
amount of the automobile congestion cost. The result is that the inverted         
u-shaped aggregate transit demand curve is lifted up on the left, essentially 
decreasing the positive network characteristics. In cities with high congestion 
costs, this again can lead to a purely downwardly sloped aggregate demand 
curve for transit, which coincides with the empirically observed facts of large, 
congested cities with a functioning transit system. This also explains why 
automobile congestion prevents the collapse of transit use as previously 
described. 
 Furthermore, if a congestion toll would be charged for the automobile 
mode, equal to the external cost an additional driver imposes on all the other 
already existing drivers, then this congestion toll would further lift the 
aggregate transit demand curve up on the left, and would cause an increased 
WTP for transit at low transit share levels. Thus, a congestion toll would not 
only, increase transit ridership as expected, but may prevent transit systems 




POLICY  CONCLUSION 
 Transportation planners always knew about the existence of network 
effects for the walking, bicycling and transit modes. However, nobody 
formalized the theory as I have done, so that it becomes possible to derive clear 
and unambiguous policy recommendations. 
 Since the aggregate demand curve derived for transportation modes 
exhibiting positive network effects has an u-shape which can lead to multiple 
equilibria, there are two major conclusions to draw from this research: On the 
one hand, transportation modes such as walking, biking and/or transit require a 
critical mass because of the u-shaped demand curve. On the other hand, the 
actual mode share outcome is path-dependent and historically determined 
because of the existence of multiple equilibria. 
 Despite the historic uniqueness of actual local transportation mode 
share equilibrium, I also expect that the actual mode share outcomes are locally 
clustered, because of the spill-over characteristics of networks, and therefore 
spatially correlated. The result would be pockets of very high walking or transit 
use in a certain city, while other areas of the same city have extremely low 
shares of these transportation modes. This is exactly what can be observed in 
large cities, such as New York, where it can be found that in parts of 
Manhattan the pedestrian mode share for walking trips is almost half, while 
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other neighborhoods have a transit mode share well above 50%. As 
econometrically shown in Goetzke (2006), this phenomenon cannot 
exclusively be explained by travel time, but also needs to be informed by the 
theory of positive network effects. 
 Goetzke (2006) further finds that if mode choice decisions are spatially 
autoregressive, a systematic bias in traffic forecasting will be introduced into 
the mode choice model, severely impacting the foundation of policy decision 
making in the context of new infrastructure investment. 
 Additional policy-relevant findings are as follows: It is not enough to 
just build new and better infrastructure with the intent of raising the mode 
share for this transportation mode. As long as the current mode share is at the 
zero equilibrium it takes more to convince people to use new and better 
facilities, which can be seen with new pedestrian, biking and/or transit facilities 
in areas with virtually no pedestrians, bikers or transit users. 
 Therefore, it is crucial for cities with a still functioning transit system to 
prevent transit ridership to drop below the critical mass. Improving automobile 
traffic may eventually lead to an irreversible collapse of transit with the 
consequence that drivers are also worse off. In this context it is important to 
mention that in a city the more people who depend on transit as their sole mode 
 32
of transportation, the more likely it is, that a person who owns an automobile 
will use transit, as well, because of network effects. 
 Finally, promoting walking, biking and/or transit use and improving 
information about these transportation modes may make it possible that the 
mode share moves from the zero equilibrium to a right-hand equilibrium, since 
marketing and advertisement campaigns function as a subsidy, essentially 
internalizing the external network benefit. 
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Figure 2.2: Linear distribution of the preference for walking with others mx over the 
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate walking demand curve for a combination of per person 
different preference for walking with others as well as for different WTP for 
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Figure 2.5: A realistic example of all combination of preference to walk with others, 
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Figure 2.6: Welfare analysis for walking demand with positive network effects, 
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Figure 2.7: The collapse of transit use from s1 to s2 after automobile cost drops from 
c1 to c2 (example for the United Stated between 1945 and 1975). 
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Figure 2.8: The u-shaped aggregate demand curve for walking pivots around the 
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Figure 2.9: With congestion on the alternative mode, the aggregate demand curve 
pivots around the point of a transit share 1. This can result into a traditionally 





















Social Network Effects in Public Transit Use: 













In this paper, I empirically test for positive network effects in transit 
use by applying a spatial autoregressive logit mode choice model with 1997/98 
work trip data from New York City. Positive network effects exist when people 
prefer to use transit together with other people as a result of social spill-over. 
Although these network preferences should differ for each person, because of 
statistical restrictions in the model, I cannot get individual network 
preferences. However, I will be able to econometrically derive a measure of 
their aggregate network preference.  
There is increasing interest in analyzing spatial dependencies and 
network effects in travel behavior. LeSage and Polasek (2005) examine 
commodity flow matrices by extending a gravity model, a tool widely used in 
the field of transportation, to include spatial autocorrelation. Using a Monte 
Carlo simulation, Páez and Scott (2005; 2006), investigate in two forthcoming 
articles the impact of social networks in discrete choice models. 
It is not entirely new to include network effects into empirical choice 
models. Brock and Durlauf have been researching methods to account for 
social interaction and neighborhood effects in both binary, as well as 
multinomial choice models (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; 2002). However, they 
do not explicitly include a spatial dimension to the discussion of the problem. 
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On the other hand, very few spatial discrete choice models have been estimated 
because of its computational complexity, none of them deal with social 
interaction and spatial spill-over effects in disaggregate transportation behavior 
(Anselin, 1988; Fleming, 2004). 
While there exists a spatially autoregressive mode choice model using 
aggregate data (Boldoc et al., 1995), a spatially autoregressive disaggregate 
mode choice model based on real-world, empirical data to examine network 
effects has never been done. 
In the next section, I will lay out the theory of how to econometrically 
model network effects, followed by an overview of the data used and the issues 
surrounding the design of the weight matrix. Then, I develop the actual 
econometric models and evaluate the result before finishing with a discussion 
of the consequences for policy makers. 
 
THEORY OF MODELING NETWORK EFFECTS 
In Goetzke (2006) the theory of network effects is introduced as it 
applies to transportation mode choice decision making. Interpreting network 
effects as a signal that a certain transportation mode is safe and reliable7, the 
main claim of the paper is that the utility of taking this mode increases with its 
                                                 
7 Just like a full restaurant is a sign for good food and satisfied customers. 
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mode share. Therefore, the more people use the mode, the more attractive this 
transportation mode becomes for all other people. These social spill-over 
effects lead to positive demand-side network externalities, the exact opposite 
from what is known as congestion.8
However, Goetzke did not provide any empirical evidence that these 
network effects exist. In this paper, I develop a rigorous econometric 
framework to examine real-world data and quantify these network effects. The 
starting point for the analysis is the random utility conditional mode choice 
model, the traditionally used workhorse of transportation demand modeling 
and forecasting (McFadden, 1974; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Train, 2003). 
Because of the structure of the spatial weight matrix used in the model, I will 
restrict the analysis in this paper to a binary mode choice model. However, the 
general approach can be extended to a multinomial mode choice model, as 
discussed in the conclusion. 
Let’s consider the utility vni of N individuals with n = 1, …, N using 
mode i, which is a function of A personal characteristics, xan, with a = 1, …, A, 
and the B mode-specific characteristics, tbi, with b = 1, …, B.  Assuming that 
vni is a linear combination of xan, tbi, as well as a random error term εni 
                                                 
8 While it is in this context possible to also analyze negative congestion externality, it is not the 
focus of this study. 
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(stemming from unobserved utility determinants), an empirical utility model 
could be expressed as follows: 
 
vni = α1 x1n  + …+ αa xan + β1 t1i + … + βb tbi + εni = xn α + ti β + εni (1) 
 
where xn is a 1 x A vector of personal characteristics, ti is a 1 x B vector of 
mode characteristics, and α and β are the corresponding column vectors of 
regression parameters.  
However, data can only be collected on transportation mode choice 
decisions, not on mode-specific utility levels. Therefore, Equation (1) has to be 
transformed in such a way that vin becomes an unobserved, latent variable. 
Assuming that εni is logistically distributed, a binary logit mode choice model 
can be derived, with Pn(i) being the probability of person n to choose mode i 
over mode j: 
 
Pni = P (vni ≥  vnj) 
      = (exp vni)/(exp vni + exp vnj) 
      = 1/[1 + exp –(vni – vnj)]        (2) 
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If the above random utility model is extended to account for network 
effects, it is necessary to add a spatially autogressive mode-choice term to 
Equation (1). Therefore, the model includes a spatial weight matrix, W, of the 
dimension N x N, as well as an N x 1 vector mi of revealed mode choice 
decisions by people. Both terms together, (Wmi), result in the spatially 
weighted average mode share of mode i for all the neighboring people of 
individual n. The scalar ρ is the regression coefficient for the spatial lag term: 
 
vni = xn α + ti β + (W mi) ρ + εni      (3) 
 
The spatially autoregressive structure becomes more visible when 
considering that mi is actually a function of the N x 1 mode-specific utility 
vector vi for all individual n. If the mode choice model is now written down in 
its full matrix form, then the issue of spatial autoregression can be easily seen: 
 
P (mi = 1) = 1/[1 + exp –(vi – vj)] 
      = F[x α, ( ti≠1 – ti=1) β, (W mi) ρ]     (4) 
 
Assuming that the error term does not exhibit any spatial 
autocorrelation, Equation (4) represents now what Anselin (2002) calls a 
 51
conditional spatially autoregressive discrete choice model. The estimation of 
this model is straight forward, since a maximum likelihood approach can be 
used. The model design is also very similar to the one proposed by Páez and 
Scott (2006), except that the network effects are not based on social 
interaction, but rather on spatial dependency. 
The 1 x N vector of probabilities P to use mode i becomes a function of: 
the N x A individual characteristics matrix x; the differences between the two    
N x B mode-specific characteristics matrices ti≠1 and ti=1, which are related to 
both available modes; the average mode share of all surrounding neighbors 
(Wmi), representing network effects; and all the corresponding vectors of 
regression coefficients α, β, as well as the regression coefficient scalar ρ. 
Because of the spatial weight matrix referring to just one mode, in its basic 
form this model can only be applied to binary choice models. I will discuss in 
the conclusion an extension towards multinomial choice models. 
 
Figure 3.1 about here 
 
Equation (4) essentially says that, with increasing neighboring mode 
share in mode i = 1, the probability of a person to also choose this 
transportation mode increases as well. Therefore, a positive value of ρ, which 
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is significantly different from zero, indicates the existence of network effects. 
Now, if the utility of using the mode is an indicator of the willingness to pay 
(WTP) and assumed to be correlated with the WTP for the transportation 
mode, the regression coefficient ρ can be interpreted as the value of the slope 
for the upward-sloping WTP curve with respect to mode share, due to network 
effects (see Figure 3.1). However, in reality it is expected that different people 
have individual levels of ρ, which cannot be modeled as such, because the 
number of variables, including all the personal network preferences would 
surpass the available degrees of freedom. Therefore, the network effects 
estimate ρ refers to the aggregate network effects. 
 
DATA SET AND WEIGHT MATRIX 
 The data used for the spatially autoregressive logit mode choice model 
is based on the 1997/1998 comprehensive regional household travel diary 
survey conducted for the Best-Practice Travel Demand Forecasting Model by 
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC). New York City 
seemed to be a very good choice for this analysis, because, while it is an 
American city, it also has a large transit ridership. These two facts make the 
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results easier transferable to both different American and other cities in the 
world.9
  The data was collected for the whole metropolitan area of 28 counties, 
which include parts of upstate New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, but I 
only took data from the five New York City boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island. The main reasons for choosing these 
boroughs are: 
 
 The New York City area has a relatively high density of surveyed 
households, allowing a meaningful weight matrix to be developed, which is 
necessary for estimating the autoregressive model. Outside of the NYC 
area, the distances between surveyed neighbors becomes rather large. 
 
 Only in New York City is the number of transit riders high enough to get 
the variability in the data set desired for econometric analysis. Also, NYC 
has an integrated transit system. Therefore, individuals there face roughly 
the same transit infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
9 The fact that the data set is almost 10 years old should not have any impact on the results, 
because of the general nature of this research. 
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For the mode choice model, only trips from home to work were used. 
The literature in classical transportation modeling distinguishes between the 
three typical trip purposes: Home-based work trips (HBW), non home-based 
trips (NHB), and home-based other trips (HBO). Each trip purpose is modeled 
differently, since the mode choice determinants are expected to differ. Purely 
for practical reasons I decided to restrict my analysis only to HBW trips. I also 
included only transit and drive-alone trips (more than 90% of all HBW trips) 
between different travel analysis zones (TAZ) within New York City which 
were longer than 1.5 miles or 2.4 km (to exclude the possibility of walking). In 
the end I had 1,652 person trips from all five boroughs of New York City, of 
which 32.7 percent drove alone to work and the remaining 67.3 percent used 
transit. 
Using U.S. census block group longitude and latitude information, 
Figure 3.2 displays the location of the surveyed households used to create the 
spatial weight matrix. As it can be seen in the map, the density of households is 
much greater in Manhattan compared to the remaining four boroughs. This can 
be contributed to the fact that the sample is not spatially random, since the 
sampling was not done with a spatially autoregressive model in mind. 
 
Figure 3.2 about here 
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Accounting for the heterogeneous household location density, a row-
standardized spatial weight matrix of the dimension N x N was developed as 
follows: Each row contains the 40 closest neighbors of the corresponding 
observation n which are equally weighted. Adding more than 40 neighbors 
would have not given significantly more information, since the average mode 
share will not change much anymore. As soon as a neighbor lives further away 
than 0.75 miles (1.2 km), however, he or she was not included, unless the 
number of neighbors would drop below four. The weight matrix needs a 
minimum number of neighbors in order to be meaningful. If a neighbor is 
further away than 0.75 (1.2 km), or a 20 minute walk, the neighborhood 
characteristics may change too much to reflect network effects. The sum of the 
weights in each row adds up to one, so that the spatial weight matrix 
effectively calculates the spatially moving transit mode split average. 
This method of deriving a spatially moving transit mode split average 
represents a unifying decision rule, while it also allows accounting for the 
heterogeneity of the boroughs in terms of spatial household density. It turns out 
that the average number of neighbors is 23, with the maximum number of 40 
neighbors existing for about a quarter of the records. The average distance of 
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neighbors is 0.4 miles (0.64 km) and very few of them, a little more than ½ 
percent, are further away than 0.75 (1.2 km).  
 
MODEL AND RESULTS 
The objective for developing the following model is to find out whether 
or not network effects exist for transit use. The basic set-up is a McFadden-
type mode choice model (McFadden, 1974) that includes the commonly used 
determinants of mode choice decision making: total travel time, access to a car, 
income, and gender. Age was not considered because of the large number of 
missing observations. Mainly to control for parking cost in Manhattan, a 
dummy was added as a proxi for all Manhattan destinations. Finally, the 
network effects for transit use was measured as the spatially autoregressive 
term of revealed mode choice decisions previously described, which essentially 
is equivalent to the spatially weighted average transit mode share of all 
neighbors. The model, however, accounts only for aggregate network effects. 
The expected individual network effects cannot be captured econometrically, 
due to the restricted number of degrees of freedom, as discussed above. 
Three different models were evaluated. The first model, called the basic 
model, omits network effects and represents the traditional approach of mode 
choice modeling. In the following two models, network effects are included. 
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The model with network effects incorporates a variable for the aggregate 
network effects. In the model with network effects controlled for car access, 
which was run to do sensitivity analysis, the network effects were split into an 
aggregate component and a component for people not having access to a car. 
 
Table 3.1 about here 
 
The results of all three models are exhibited in Table 3.1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses and statistical significance is indicated by stars. 
All estimated regression coefficients of the basic model have the expected 
signs. Except for the mode-specific constant and the high income group 
variable, they are also significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. 
While it is not a problem that the estimate of the regression coefficient for the 
high income group variable is not significantly different from zero, it is 
potentially a problem for the mode-specific constant term, since it is expected 
that people prefer the automobile over transit. 
The regression coefficient of the total travel time variable is negative 
because the indirect utility derived from using any transportation mode 
decreases with more time spent on it. In this context it should be emphasized 
that the total travel time regression coefficient of the McFadden-type mode 
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choice model is based on the difference of the mode-specific travel time, using 
the transportation mode in the constant term as the point of reference. 
Therefore, total travel time measures effectively how much it takes longer to 
ride transit in comparison to the car. 
Obviously, if a person does not have access to a car, he or she is more 
likely to use transit. This explains the positive sign for the no-access-to-a-car 
dummy coefficient estimate. Since parking is very costly in Manhattan, people 
are more inclined to take transit there, which makes the regression coefficient 
positive. The automobile is a normal good, therefore, the high income group 
will avoid transit, resulting in a negative coefficient estimate. Finally, men are 
less willing to ride transit, leading to a negative regression coefficient. 
The model with network effects improves upon the mode-specific 
constant (in comparison to the basic model), since the regression coefficient 
estimate, while keeping its negative sign, becomes now significantly different 
from zero. In addition, the new model reveals a positive aggregate network 
effects for transit use, while all the other coefficient values remain very robust. 
A negative network effects coefficient value would have been a sign of an 
aggregate personal aversion towards transit crowding which is typically known 
as congestion externality. 
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It is interesting to interpret the constant term together with the network 
effects: With very low transit mode share, the relative indirect utility of using 
transit is smaller than for driving alone (see negative value of the constant). As 
soon as the transit mode share moves towards one, the difference of indirect 
utility between transit use and drive alone decreases until transit use utility 
eventually surpasses indirect utility of driving alone, since the network effects 
coefficient is larger than the coefficient for the constant. This is exactly what is 
expected from network effects. The willingness to pay for transit, which is 
related to the indirect utility, increases when more people take transit, and thus 
lowers the relative cost of using transit (vs. the car). 
In the model with network total travel time is the major variable 
representing the supply side. For the transit mode, total travel time includes in-
vehicle travel time, access and egress time, as well as wait time. For the drive 
alone mode, total travel time is based on the automobile travel speed. 
Therefore, total travel time is an aggregate variable of the physical 
infrastructure, accounting for transit service level and highway congestion. 
However, what if the network effects variable captures a portion of the 
supply side? It can be seen in Table 3.1 that the coefficient estimates for total 
travel time are essentially the same in the basic model and the model with 
network effects. In the case of network effects incorporating the infrastructure, 
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it is expected that the values would be not as close as they are. It could also be 
argued that the network effects variable accounts for some unmeasured supply 
level. For example, a person without having access to a car may live closer to a 
transit station and is more likely surrounded by people also without car access. 
Thus, better transit availability could easily explain network effects. 
The model with network effects controlling for car access addresses the 
issue by splitting the network effects into two components: the aggregate 
network effects and the network effects for people without access to a car. The 
most important finding is that the inclusion of the second network effect 
component does not greatly change the value of the regression coefficient for 
aggregate network effects. Furthermore, the estimate of the network effects 
regression coefficient for people without access to a car is not significantly 
different from zero. If the network effects variable for people with no access to 
a car is analyzed in conjunction with the no-access-to-a-car dummy, it can be 
seen that the network effects coefficient absorbs part of the dummy coefficient. 
The dummy coefficient estimate becomes less significant and decreases at 
about the same value of the additional network effects regression coefficient 
for people without access to a car, multiplied by the average transit mode 
share. All other coefficient estimates remain stable in value and significance. 
The attempt of the last model to control for potentially unobserved supply side 
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effects that stem from the physical infrastructure did not yield any 
improvements. The original model with network effects can be viewed as 
robust. 
It still may be possible that the network effects variable captures some 
effects of the transit amenities such as transit safety, crime rates, station 
cleanliness or infrastructure quality. Furthermore, using transit in high numbers 
may even generate these amenities, when, for example, transit riders create a 
less crime-ridden environment, or demand a cleaner transit station. This is 
exactly what Goetzke (2006) discussed as the possible source of network 
effects, when he views them as a signal for safe and reliable transit. Therefore, 
unlike in the typical mode choice model, all these formerly omitted transit 
characteristics can now conveniently be seen as summarized in the network 
effects variable. In this context, the network effects variable gives way to a 
nice interpretation: It essentially becomes an indication of people’s perception 
how well transit works. 
Now it can be concluded that in the presence of network effects, the 
individual mode choice decision making does not only depend on personal 
traits and mode-specific characteristics, but also on the mode share of the 
person’s neighborhood. This means, everything else being equal, and counter 
to conventional wisdom, that poor people are less likely to use transit in areas 
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with low transit share than in areas with high transit share. On the other hand, 
more wealthy people take transit in areas with high transit share compared to 
areas with low transit share. 
 
POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
The fact that transit use exhibits network effects may lead to far-
reaching policy consequences. It is typical for both transportation planners as 
well as policy decision makers to depend on travel demand forecasting models 
for evaluating new transit projects. The centerpiece of every travel demand 
forecasting model is the mode choice model, which traditionally does not 
include a network effects variable to account for spatial autoregression. This 
non-inclusion of network effects in the model formulation causes an omitted 
variable bias which becomes visible in the mode-specific constant term, as 
shown in Goetzke (2003). The result is, therefore, a systematic forecasting 
error where transit ridership in suburbs with low transit mode share are 
overestimated and transit ridership in the central city with high transit mode 
share are underestimated. 
In the traditional mode choice model approach, with everything else 
being equal, the mode-specific constant term for transit use captures the 
difference in indirect utility between transit use and the alternative mode (in 
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this case: drive-alone trips). If this mode-specific constant term is not allowed 
to change in space, a person in the suburbs with low transit ridership will be 
forced to have the same average differential indirect utility for transit use over 
driving alone as the person living in the central city with high transit ridership. 
However, in reality, network effects are responsible for the fact that a person 
living in a transit-unfriendly suburb derives less differential utility from 
choosing transit over driving with the car, than the person living in the transit-
friendly city.  
It should now be easy to see that as long as the differential utility for 
using transit in the suburbs is lower than average, and in the central city, higher 
than average, transit ridership will be overestimated in the suburbs and 
underestimated in the central city. Figure 3.3 demonstrates graphically how not 
including the network effects variable into the model leads to an omitted 
variable bias in the regression. 
 
Figure 3.3 about here 
 
This new insight might at least partially explain why new rail starts in 
the past decade have had problems with inflated ridership forecasts compared 
to the observed ridership after opening (Pickrell, 1989; Kain, 1992). Since the 
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federally funded rail projects studied by Pickrell serve mostly the commuter 
market from the suburbs to the CBD, the systematic bias in the mode choice 
model caused by unaccounted for spatial autoregression stemming from 
network effect could be responsible for overestimating ridership. Not 
accounting for network effects may have also dwarfed the forecasts of Tren 
Urbano in Puerto Rico, which is in 2005 less than a third of the originally 
expected ridership (Green, 2005). 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have shown that network effects play a role in mode choice decision 
making. However, the theory only allows for spatially autoregressive binary 
mode choice models because of the spatial weight matrix character (Wm*), 
with m* taking on the value of either zero or one, but never a larger number. 
Given what was discussed in this paper about spatially autoregressive binary 
mode choice models, it is not difficult to extend the general concept to 
multinomial or even nested mode choice models. The spatial lag term 
representing the network effects is just the average mode share of all the 
spatially weighted neighbors. By replacing the social interaction with spatial 
dependency, this concept can easily be included in the model structure 
proposed by Páez and Scott (2005). 
 65
An extension of the mode choice model would be to not only include 
network effects on the origin side of the trip, but also on the destination side of 
the trip. Intuitively, this makes a lot of sense since people make their mode 
choice decision based on both origin characteristics and on destination 
characteristics. LeSage and Pace (2005) find an elegant solution for designing 
the appropriate spatial weight matrix. 
While the estimation of a spatially autoregressive mode choice model is 
feasible as long as the data is collected on the basis of spatial sampling, the real 
challenge poses the inclusion of network effects in mode choice forecasting for 
new infrastructure investment projects. In traditional mode choice models, the 
mode share is exclusively determined by the social characteristics as well as 
trip costs – both being assumed to be exogenous. Network effects, however, 
lead to the fact that a portion of the trip cost (WTP for using the mode with 
others) itself becomes endogenous. At the same time, one does not know what 
the individual preference for using the transportation mode together with other 
people would be. 
This problem is somewhat similar to the issue of congestion in the 
mode choice model, where a portion of the trip cost (congestion cost) also 
becomes endogenous. As part of the travel time variable, it is assumed that the 
congestion cost effects everyone the same way as an average congestion cost 
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does. When faced with this problem, the typical resolution for deriving model 
forecasts is a simulation approach, where the model results are iteratively 
looped until convergence is reached. 
In the context of network effects, the simulation approach assumes that 
socio-economic characteristics are exogenous and will not change with the 
implementation of new transit facilities, which essentially means that improved 
public transit triggers nobody to move. Such an assumption is unrealistic, since 
the social composition of a neighborhood is, of course, endogenous with 
respect to transportation infrastructure. This problem even exists for traditional 
mode choice models, but may be alleviated by including a land-use model. 
However, network effects do magnify the problem. People move into the 
neighborhood because of the new transportation infrastructure and will use this 
mode now available. In addition, the new residents will also trigger already 
older residents to switch to the newly available transportation mode. Therefore, 
a mode choice model that includes network effects has to always integrate a 
land-use model when deriving forecasts. 
In the context of the four-step transportation model, I am convinced that 
not just the mode choice step is spatially autoregressive, but also the trip 
generation model and the trip assignment model. LeSage and Polasek (2005) 
discuss the possibility of spatial autoregression in the trip distribution model. 
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Naturally, people in the central city make more, but shorter trips than their 
suburban counterparts. They also tend select their destinations, i.e. shopping, 
based on the destinations of others. Especially in congested cities, people might 
even choose their routes on what is conceived as being the fastest way, but may 
actually become slower because of these route choice network effects causing 
congestion. After all, the actual decision making in difficult traffic conditions 
will always lack full information with the result that assignment flows may be 
in a continuous disequilibrium, or in equilibrium, but with network effects. 
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Figure 3.1: Positive network effects for an individual person in 
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Figure 3.2: Geo-coded locations of all surveyed households in New York City. 
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Table 3.1: Estimation results for the New York City mode choice model. 
 Basic Model Model with                 
Network Effects 
Model with Network Effects   
Controlling for Car Access 
Transit Mode Constant  
(drive alone = 0, transit = 1) 
-0.079                     
(0.194) 
-1.047**                    
(0.248) 
-1.001**                    
(0.250) 
Total Travel Time (0, 1) 
-0.036**                    
(0.006) 
-0.035**                    
(0.006) 
-0.036**                    
(0.006) 
           Average Network 
Effect for Transit Use (1) 
 1.887**                     
(0.293) 
1.813**                    
(0.296) 
Additional Transit Network 
Effect for No Car Access (1) 
  2.174                     
(1.591) 
  No Car Access Dummy (1) 
4.258**                     
(0.398) 
3.893**                     
(0.404) 
2.463*                    
(1.041) 
Destination Manhattan (1) 
1.991**                     
(0.201) 
1.831**                     
(0.207) 
1.819**                    
(0.207) 
High Income Dummy (1) 
-0.242                     
(0.157) 
-0.311                     
(0.161) 
-0.309                    
(0.161) 
Male Dummy (1) 
-0.702**                    
(0.159) 
-0.735**                    
(0.163) 
-0.730**                   
(0.163) 
Sample Size 1,652 1,652 1,652 
Log-likelihood -534.03 -512.75 -511.80 
Pseudo-R2 0.528 0.546 0.546 
*significant at the 5%–level 
**significant at the 1%–level 
Figure 3.3: In the presence of network effects transit utility increases with 
higher transit mode share. However, if network effects are not included 
into the model, transit utility is forced to be constant, which leads to an 
omitted variable bias. Therefore, transit ridership will be systematically 
underestimated in the suburbs (v1 < v2), and overestimated in the central 
city (v1 > v2). 
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Bicycle Use in Germany: Explaining Differences  














The bicycle modal split in German cities differs significantly. It ranges 
from a low of less than five percent in the state capital, Wiesbaden, to a high of 
more than one-third in the university town, Münster. Conventional wisdom 
would refer to Wiesbaden’s hilliness to explain the small number of bicyclists, 
and to Münster’s young average age in Münster to explain the opposite pattern 
there. A city’s physical environment (i.e. its topography, infrastructure, socio-
economic composition, including age and the trip characteristics) plays a 
dominate role in determining how many people use their bike. The results of 
Siu et. al. (2000) and Rieveld (2004) support the importance of these 
municipal traits. In this paper, I apply a binary discrete choice model, which 
includes not only these traditional variables, but also a measure of the city’s 
“biking culture”. I find that the probability of a person riding a bicycle 
increases with the city’s level of “biking culture”. 
“Biking culture” is best described as a social interaction or spill-over 
phenomenon, where a larger number of bicyclists make it more likely that 
some other person will also ride a bike. In the literature, this subject matter is 
discussed as neighborhood or social network effects (Shy, 2001; Goetzke, 
2006a). In the last few years innovative econometric approaches were 
developed to empirically test for these social network effects (Brock and 
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Durlauf, 2001; 2002; Paez and Scott 2005; 2006; Dugundji and Walker, 2005; 
Goetzke 2006b). This study is not only the first bicycle choice model for 
Germany,10 but also the first to use municipal-level social network effects 
reflecting “biking culture” to explain bicycle modal share differences across 
cities.11 If social network effects indeed play a significant role in whether or 
not people choose a bike as their transportation mode, then approaches to 
bicycle policy may shift to building and supporting a “biking culture” rather 
than exclusively to improving infrastructure. In general, bicycle infrastructure 
results from biking culture, while good bicycle infrastructure does not 
necessarily improve biking culture. 
The next section provides an overview of the data used and develops an 
explanatory framework. Then I introduce a methodology to capture biking 
culture through social network effects and develop an econometric model. 





                                                 
10 All German bicycling studies are restricted to either qualitative or univariate statistical 
analysis. 
11 As of now, no mode-choice model has dealt with city-wide network effects. 
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PREVIOUS LITERATURE,  
EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK, AND DATA 
 Using data from the 2002 nationwide survey of travel behavior, 
“Mobility in Germany – MiG 2002” (BMVBW, 2003), I build a binary logistic 
regression model to analyze municipal differences in bicycle mode choice 
decision making. 
Few regression models have been developed to explain the difference 
in bicycle use between cities within a country. For Germany, just two studies 
compare bicycle behavior across cities (Pez, 1998, Flade et. al., 2002), but 
neither employs a regression model. Rietveld and Daniel (2004) used an 
aggregate regression model with data from 103 Dutch municipalities. They 
found that besides socio-economic and demographic variables, weather and 
bicycle infrastructure have statistically significant impacts on bicycle mode 
share. In the only discrete choice model looking at municipal differences in the 
bike modal split, Siu et. al. (2000) determined that a topography dummy 
variable is positive and significantly different from zero. Rave (2005) provides 
an excellent overview of the empirical bicycle studies. 
 Explanatory variables used in these regression models, as well as in 
other research papers, such as single-city bike choice models (Ortuzar et. al., 
2000), can be grouped into three categories: 
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1. Individual characteristics: Sex, age and income are considered the 
most important personal variables to determine bicycle use. Males are 
typically more likely to use a bike, while bicycle riding decreases with 
age. Poor people tend to ride their bike more often. 
 
2. Trip characteristics: Trip length and weather are the typically included 
determinants of bicycle use. Longer trips, and bad weather are not 
conducive to biking. 
 
3. Municipal characteristics: Empirical evidence points to biking 
infrastructure and topography as having a significant impact on 
bicycling. People are more likely to bike if the biking infrastructure is 
good and if the topography is flat. In some aggregate regression 
analyses, such as in Rietveld and Daniel (2004), other municipal 
characteristics, e.g. city size and density are used as a proxy for 
average trip length. In this study, which uses a discrete choice model, 
the inclusion of trip length renders these variables as unnecessary. 
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The MiG 2002 provides most of the data described above. The basic 
sample has 25,000 household records, 61,000 person records and 180,000 trip 
records. The additional regionally extended samples (Aufstockungstichprobe) 
bring the total up to approximately 50,000 households, 100,000 persons, and 
400,000 trips.  
Using the extended samples for the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Northrhine-Westphalia), as well as for the metropolitan area of Frankfurt, the 
region of Hannover, as well as the transportation districts of Nordhessen 
(North Hesse) and Bremen/Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), I could identify a 
total of 32 cities larger than 50,000 inhabitants. The dataset with these 32 cities 
had more than 30,000 trips, which was reduced to around 10,000 trips after 
trips of persons less than 15 years old, weekend trips, trips longer than 100 km, 
business trips, and return trips were removed. However, I could derive 
bicycling infrastructure proxies for only 24 of the 32 municipalities, which 
brought the final sample size to 8,725, with each city subset having at least 100 
trip records. Table 4.1 exhibits the summary statistics, as well as the source for 
all variables included in the model. 
 
Table 4.1 about here 
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 Included variables describing individual characteristics are male, age, 
and low income. Since I have only information on income groups, I have 
aggregated the three lower income groups (monthly net household income less 
than 1,500 Euro) into a “poor” dummy variable. This dummy variable 
represents a bit more than one-eighth of the population, which coincides with 
the German poverty data. 
Our model uses three variables, trip length, bad weather, and trip 
purpose for trip characteristics. A bad weather dummy was set to one if the 
conditions reported in MiG were either rain or snow. The trip purpose was 
split up into five categories: work trips, educational trips, shopping trips, 
leisure trips and all other trips (includes doctor visits, running an errand, etc). 
The three variables included as municipal characteristics are 
topography, biking infrastructure and social network effects. None of these 
variables were part of the MiG survey. A flat topography dummy was set to 
one as long the city center and most of the area within the city did not appear 
as hilly by looking at topographical maps. I verified the results by telephone 
interviews with city officials. The flat topography values for each city are 




Table 4.2 about here 
  
This dataset only has information about travel time and distance for the 
chosen mode, but not for all the alternative modes, as is typically for    
McFadden-type travel demand models (McFadden, 1974). Thus, a different 
approach had to be found to control for each municipality’s unique 
infrastructure. To avoid multicollinearity between variables, the additional 
challenge was to find an infrastructure variable that does not correlate with the 
social network effects variable (we discuss this issue in the next section). Two 
different approaches were used to derive a social network effects variable: 
 
1. We conducted a telephone survey for 20 cities to find the bike lanes 
length in each municipality (in km). This value is divided by the 
population to calculate the bike lane length per 1,000 inhabitants. It 
would have been preferable to compute bike lanes per area, but in 
Germany the municipal boundaries are politically determined and do 
not reflect the urbanized area. A city’s reported area often includes 




2. In 2005, the German Federation of Bicyclist (ADFC) undertook a 
survey where people evaluated the bicycle infrastructure in their city 
(ADFC, 2005). Using the mean of both, accessibility for infrastructure 
quantity and average speed for infrastructure quality, I aggregate a bike 
infrastructure score which is ranging between a low of 0 for the worst 
infrastructure and a high of 5 for the best infrastructure. However, the 
data was available for only 17 cities. 
 
While the “Bike Lane per Capita” variable seems to be more objective, 
bicyclists typically make decisions based on a personal, highly subjective 
assessment of the bicycle infrastructure. This may be better captured in the 
“Infrastructure Score” variable. The infrastructure proxies are highly 
correlated with each other, having for the 13 common cities in the two datasets 
a correlation coefficient of 0.675, which is significant at the 2-percent level. 
This result is some indication that both infrastructure variables may capture 
essentially the same effects. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Goetzke (2006a) introduces the theory of social network effects as it 
applies to transportation mode choice decision making. Interpreting social 
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network effects as a signal that biking is safe and reliable,12 the paper’s main 
claim is that the utility of taking a bicycle increases with its mode share. 
Therefore, the more people using a bike, the more attractive a bike becomes to 
all other people. These social spill-over effects lead to positive demand-side 
network externalities, which I also refer to as biking culture in this paper. 
In the last few years, several articles developed different approaches to 
econometrically model these social network effects. Based on the theoretical 
work by Brock and Durlauf (2001; 2002), Dugundji and Walker (2005) and 
Goetzke (2006b) used a social network effects approach to model travel 
demand. While Dugundji and Walker took zonal modal spit averages as a 
proxy for social network effects, Goetzke extended this approach to a spatially 
autoregressive mode choice model with moving mode share averages. Because 
of the different nature of the dataset, which includes more than one 
municipality, neither of these two methods is applicable for this paper. 
In the spirit of the previous papers, I could have taken the average 
modal split for bicycling in each municipality as the proxy for social network 
effects. Because of the endogeneity of the biking culture proxy, however, this 
approach may exhibit a correlation between the social network effects variable 
and the error term, leading to a biased regression coefficient estimate. 
                                                 
12 Just like a full restaurant is a sign for good food and satisfied customers. 
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Therefore, the model requires an instrument that is correlated with the social 
network effects variable but not with the error term.  
To create such an instrument, I have taken the trip purpose category 
(work and educational trips, shopping trips, leisure trips, and all other trips) 
and removed one trip purpose at a time from the dataset to get four different 
subsets. Then, the bicycle mode share derived from the excluded trip purpose 
records could be used as the instrument for the social network effects. 
 A total of four new datasets were generated: one excluding work and 
educational trips (bike mode share of work and educational trips is the social 
network effects variable); one excluding shopping trips (bike mode share of 
shopping trips is the social network effects variable); one excluding leisure 
trips (bike mode share of leisure trips is the social network effects variable); 
and one excluding all the other trips (bike mode share of other trips is the 
social network effects variable). The first column of Table 4.3 shows the 
correlation coefficients between the instrumental variables for biking culture 
and the total municipal bicycle mode share, an indicator of social network 
effects used in previous studies. 
 
Table 4.3 about here 
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The social network effects instrument captures municipal biking 
culture only as long as they are neither correlated with an omitted variable, nor 
with an included variable, such as biking infrastructure. Ignoring the 
infrastructure variable should upwardly bias the network coefficient because of 
the positive correlation between social network effects and infrastructure 
(omitted variable bias). On the other hand, if the infrastructure proxy is highly 
correlated with the social network effects variable, then coefficients of both 
variables may be adversely affected by multicollinearity. 
Column 2 and 3 of Table 4.3 report the correlation coefficients between 
the social network effects proxies and the two infrastructure variables 
introduced in the previous section. The bicycle modal split for work and 
educational trips is correlated with the infrastructure score at the one percent 
significance level, the bicycle modal split for shopping trips is correlated with 
the infrastructure score at the five percent level, and four other correlations are 
significant at the ten percent level. 
When I combine all three groups of determinants for bicycling choice, 
municipal, trip, and individual characteristics, a structural form of the binary 




Bike = α + β* individual characteristics + γ*trip characteristics  
+ δ*municipal characteristics + ε     (1) 
 
Equation (1) ties together all the previous information. Male, age and 
the poverty dummy were used as individual characteristics. Included trip 
characteristics were trip length, a bad weather dummy, as well as the trip 
purpose (work, educational, shopping, leisure and other trips). Finally, the 
social network effects instruments, either of the two infrastructure proxies, and 
a flat topography dummy were taken as municipal characteristics. 
 In order for the regression estimation to be unbiased, the error terms 
should not be correlated with any of the independent variables which is a 
reasonable assumption. The social network effects instrument will actually 
capture all the remaining city-level autocorrelation in the error term, while, at 
the same time, not being correlated with the error term, because it is an 
exogenous instrument (bike mode share of the excluded trip purpose). 
 Another assumption of the model set-up is that there is no self-selection 
of the residential location. Since I analyze the city as a whole, and not specific 
neighborhoods, this assumption is expected to be met since few people will be 
choosing a city to live in just because of its biking culture. In this context, it 
may be also important to mention, that the dataset includes only trips where 
the bicycle is used predominately as a mode of transportation, not as a 
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recreational tool. All the trips which recorded leisure as the trip purpose refer 
to the leisure activity undertaken at one of the trip ends. 
 At this point, however, the reader needs to be cautioned about one 
issue. Each municipality has a different level of biking culture represented in 
the social network effects variable. The regression coefficient for the social 
network effects estimates just the average impact of this biking culture on 
bicycle mode choice for all the cities combined. Unfortunately, a city-specific 
coefficient estimate is statistically impossible to obtain because the social 
network effects instruments would essentially become a municipal dummy. It 
would account for the average effect of all omitted city-level variables that 
would otherwise enter into the error term. 
 
MODEL AND RESULTS 
We evaluated eight models, two subgroups with four different data sets, 
respectively. The first subgroup includes bike lanes per capita for 20 
municipalities as the infrastructure proxy, while the second subgroup uses the 
bike infrastructure score existing for 17 cities. Each of the four different data 
sets excludes one trip purpose (work and educational, shopping, leisure or 
other trips) so that the bike mode share for the excluded trip purpose could be 
used as the social network effects instrument. Tables 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) present 
 89
the regression results. Most regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the five-percent level or better and, with one exception discussed 
below, the signs are as expected. 
 
Tables 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) about here 
 
In all eight models, the social network effects regression coefficients 
have the expected positive sign, and are significantly different from zero at the 
one-percent level. This is a strong indication that municipal biking culture 
plays an important role in bicycle mode choice decision making. Therefore, a 
strong biking culture raises the probability that a person will ride the bike, 
ceteris paribus. 
As seen in Table 4.4 (a), the regression coefficients for bike lanes per 
capita also have the expected positive sign, and are significantly different from 
zero at the ten-percent level or better. But if the infrastructure variable is used 
instead, the sign of the regression coefficient in Model (5), which excludes 
work and school trips, becomes unexpectedly negative at the one-percent 
significance level. All other regression coefficients are still positive and 
significantly different at the one-percent level. 
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The “wrong” sign for the bike lane coefficient in Model (5) may be 
explained by multicollinearity between the infrastructure measure and social 
network effects proxy, which are both correlated with each other at the one-
percent level (see Table 3). This multicollinearity will likely result in the 
infrastructure score picking up some remaining effects from an omitted 
variable. 
The effects of all the other included variables are as follows. Flat 
topography is more conducive to biking, as seen in the corresponding positive 
sign of the regression coefficient, which is in all cases significantly different 
from zero at the five-percent level or better. The longer the trip, the fewer 
people ride the bike. This relation ship is expressed in the trip length 
regression coefficient, which is always negative at the one-percent significance 
level. In bad weather, people are less likely to use their bicycle, causing the 
corresponding regression coefficient to have a negative sign which is 
significantly different from zero at the one-percent level at all times. 
If compared to the base trip purpose (which is leisure in three models, 
and other trips in the remaining one), people prefer to ride the bike to work and 
especially to educational destinations (positive signs for both the work and 
educational trip coefficients are always significantly different from zero at the 
one-percent level). For all other trip purposes the regression coefficient is not 
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significantly different from zero at the ten-percent significance level. Only in 
Model (8) is the shopping trip regression coefficient negative, and significantly 
different from zero at the five-percent level, making it a less preferred bike trip 
compared to the base trip purpose (leisure trip). 
Males are more likely to use the bike, signified by a positive regression 
coefficient, which is always significantly different from zero at the one-percent 
level. On the other hand, age never has a statistically significant effect on 
bicycle riding. Finally, in two of the models using bike lanes per capita as the 
infrastructure measure, the poverty dummy has a significant positive effect at 
the five-percent level, providing some evidence that biking is an inferior good. 
Multicollinearity may explain the low level of significance of the age and 
poverty coefficient estimate. Both variables are correlated with the trip purpose 
categories. For example, work trips are undertaken by people who are typically 
not poor, and people taking educational trips tend to be young. 
The magnitude of the regression coefficients estimated do not change 
between the eight models, and, in most cases, the actual values are very close 
together. This result supports the fact that the model specification is robust, 
especially given the somewhat different set of municipalities the two 
subgroups cover. 
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In summary, the regression results show that social network effects, 
such as a varying biking culture in different cities, play an important role in 
determining a person’s probability to ride the bicycle. The outcome, however, 
hinges on the assumption that the models control sufficiently for all other 
effects, especially the ones positively correlated with social network effects, 
such as infrastructure. Given the robustness of the model’s regression 
coefficient estimates for social network effects, I believe that this assumption 
is a reasonable one.  
 
POLICY DISCUSSION 
 Transportation planners typically believe that the most important policy 
for increasing bicycle mode share is to improve biking infrastructure (Nelson 
and Allen, 1997). The basic argument is that better facilities will lower the 
cost, and hence will increase the consumption of biking. In general, the model 
supports this policy approach, as the positive marginal effects of the 
infrastructure proxies reported in Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) show. 
 
Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) about here 
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Because of the easier interpretation, only bike-lanes-per-capita is used 
for the discussion of the infrastructure variable. Depending on which trip 
purpose is excluded, its marginal effects range between 0.05 and 0.10, with an 
average of 0.075. This means that for a city of 100,000 inhabitants, building 1 
km of bike lanes (or 0.01 km per 1,000 capita) will add 0.00075 to an average 
person’s probability to ride the bike, or 0.075 percentage points. In other 
words, if a city invests in about 13.3 km of new bike lanes, the bike choice 
probability would go up by approximately one percentage point, say from 10 
percent to 11 percent. 
 The model also included a second policy variable, social network 
effects capturing aspects of biking culture. Its marginal effects are shown in 
Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). The values for the marginal effects for social network 
effects lie between one-third and two-third, again depending on which trip 
purpose is excluded. 
The excluded trip purpose can be used to identify the relative 
dependence of each trip purpose on social network effects and which one less. 
Again, only the dataset with the bike-lane-per-capita variable is used for ease 
of interpretation. The two models with the lowest marginal effects for the 
network instruments are the ones excluding other trips (0.34) and shopping 
trips (0.46). This means the trip purposes that depend most heavily on social 
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network effects are other trips and shopping trips. The trip purposes most 
independent of social network effects are work and education trips, as well as 
leisure trips, since the marginal effect of the datasets excluding these two trip 
purposes were 0.53 and 0.65, respectively. 
 It makes sense that social network effects are not so important for 
leisure trip. People take their bicycle for recreation, because they enjoy it and 
not because they see other people riding their bike. While social network 
effects become more important for work and educational trips, they still do not 
have such an impact if compared to shopping and other trips. The reason may 
lie in the fact that for work and educational trips people evaluate the bike mode 
in comparison to their other alternatives whose cost can be significantly higher 
as long as congestion and parking for the automobile are included (infinite for 
people who do not have access to a car, such as young people with an 
educational destination). And public transit may make the trip much longer if 
access, wait, transfer and egress times are accounted for, in addition to the cost 
of being sometimes unreliable. 
 It is not at all surprising that shopping and other trips are the most 
sensitive to social network effects. People may only get the idea to go 
shopping or see the doctor by bicycle as long as they are inspired by others 
who do the same. This analysis indicates that both shopping and other trips 
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have the highest potential for increasing their bike mode share following if a 
city’s biking culture improves.  
 In reality, however, better infrastructure for bicycles and improved 
biking culture complement, rather than supplement each other. Of course, if a 
new bicycle facility increases the bike modal split, this higher bike mode share 
will, in return, have a positive impact on social network effects. At the same 
time, municipalities with a strong biking culture are more inclined to invest in 
bicycle infrastructure. Hence, there may be some truth to the claim that not 
only biking culture is endogenous to bicycle infrastructure, but also vice versa. 
 On the other hand, while better bicycle facilities will decrease the cost 
of biking, the lower cost may not necessarily prompt people to start riding the 
bike, as long as nobody did before. This is the deeper insight of the model 
results: If people already use their bike, infrastructure improvements will carry 
a double dividend, one from the lower biking cost and one through the social 
network effects. If nobody did ride the bicycle before the infrastructure 
improvement, however, it may very well be possible that the better biking 
facility will not increase bike ridership. Therefore, in the later case, the focus 





 This research adds a new dimension to the bike policy discussion by 
finding that the quantity and quality of bicycle infrastructure is not the only 
policy variable determining a city’s bike mode share, but that in this context 
biking culture, or social network effects also needs to be considered. Whether 
or not focusing on improving biking culture turns out to be more cost-effective 
than building better bicycle facilities, however, remains to be researched. 
 The regression results presented in this paper show that municipal 
biking culture has an important impact on the probability of choosing the bike 
as a transportation mode. To quantify the importance of these social network 
effects, I additionally ran a regression with the whole dataset (no trip purpose 
excluded) using just a city-specific dummy variables to capture infrastructure, 
topography and social network effects combined. Then I regressed both 
infrastructure (bike-lanes-per-capita) and topography together on the city-
specific dummy variables, and finally added in another regression a newly 
derived social network effects measure (the city’s bike mode share for all 
trips). The result was that the first two variables account for approximately 
40% of the variation, while social network effects account for another 45% 
(see Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6 about here 
 
 This alternative approach confirms that biking culture, controlled for 
infrastructure and topography, has explanatory power. If the social network 
effects instrument would not be included, it is expected that an omitted 
variable bias will develop, making the model inconsistent. The bias will then 
most likely be captured in the infrastructure variable, which is strongly 
correlated with social network effects. 
The result that social network effects are important is also visible in the 
city-specific dummy coefficient estimate for Münster, which was not 
significantly different from zero even at the ten-percent level. The 
interpretation of the result would be that in Münster nothing deters people 
from riding the bike. As the average person is indifferent between using the 
bicycle and all the other transportation modes, the bike must be viewed as 
essentially equal to any other transportation mode. On the other hand, the 
dummy regression coefficients of all the other cities have a negative sign and 
are significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. This result shows 
that Münster, which is considered the biking capital of Germany and where 
one third of all trips are done by bicycle, has indeed a stronger biking culture 
than the other cities included in the study. 
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 Bike mode choice and biking culture may be a simultaneous process, 
possibly making the social network effects variable endogenous. The 
consequence would be that the coefficient estimate for social network effects is 
upwardly biased. My approach to circumvent this problem was to use an 
instrument derived from the excluded trip purpose records. 
Another simultaneous process could be biking culture and 
infrastructure, which would explain the correlation between both variables. 
This means that the model may exhibit some level of multicollinearity. The 
coefficient estimates of all other variables would be still unbiased, but the 
model as a whole would become less robust. However, except for model (2), 
all the regression coefficients in the models are stable. 
All together, this paper presented an innovative approach to analyze 
bicycle mode share differences in German municipalities, which could change 
the way bike policy is conducted in the future. The results of the models 
emphasize the importance of the city’s biking culture as a determinate of an 
individual’s probability to choose the bike as the mode of transportation. 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for included model variables. 
 
 Source N Min. Max. Mean S.E. 
Bike Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.12 0.003 
Bike Share (Work & 
Education) MiG 2002 8,725 0 0.41 0.15 0.001 
Bike Share (Shopping) MiG 2002 8,725 0 0.42 0.11 0.001 
Bike Share (Leisure) MiG 2002 8,725 0 0.34 0.12 0.001 
Bike Share (Other Trips) MiG 2002 8,725 0 0.34 0.11 0.001 
Bike Lanes per Capita Phone Survey 6,634 0.26 1.16 0.69 0.003 
Bike Infrastructure 
Score 
ADFC 7,834 1.13 3.67 2.39 0.008 
Flat Topography Own derivation 8,725 0 1 0.77 0.005 
Trip Length MiG 2002 8,725 0 96 6.70 0.111 
Bad Weather MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.21 0.004 
Work Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.22 0.004 
Educational Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.04 0.002 
Shopping Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.29 0.005 
Leisure Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.28 0.005 
Other Trips MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.18 0.004 
Male MiG 2002 8,725 0 1 0.45 0.005 
Age MiG 2002 8,725 15 91 46.45 0.184 















Aachen 1 10.3% 0.47  
Arnsberg 0 7.6% 0.64  
Bielefeld 1 6.9% 1.10 2.31 
Bonn 1 12.2% 0.80 2.59 
Darmstadt 1 19.1% 1.16 2.07 
Delmenhorst 1 21.0%  2.52 
Düsseldorf 1 18.4% 0.61 1.15 
Frankfurt 1 9.5%  1.76 
Hamm 1 8.5% 0.87 2.64 
Hanau 1 8.0%  1.70 
Hannover 1 14.3% 0.71 2.94 
Kassel 0 1.0% 0.35 1.34 
Köln 1 9.9%  1.60 
Marburg 0 9.4% 1.03  
Münster 1 35.4% 0.98 3.67 
Neuss 1 6.2% 0.50 2.28 
Offenbach 1 3.8% 0.64  
Oldenburg 1 25.3% 0.94 3.16 
Recklinghausen 1 2.8% 0.79  
Rüsselsheim 1 11.8% 1.02 2.78 
Velbert 0 4.2% 1.14  
Viersen 1 11.0% 0.94  
Wesel 1 16.8% 0.94 3.42 
Wiesbaden 0 2.4% 0.26 0.72 




Table 4.3: Coefficients for the correlations of the network proxies with 
total bike model share and the two different infrastructure variables. 
 
Network Proxies (Based on 
the Bike Mode Share of 
Excluded Trip Purpose) 
Total Bike 
Mode Share 





Work and Education 0.901*** 0.295 0.782*** 
Shopping 0.927*** 0.407* 0.541** 
Leisure 0.872*** 0.335 0.475* 
Other 0.789*** 0.426* 0.421* 
*** significant at the 1-percent level 
**   significant at the 5-percent level 













Table 4.4(a): Binary logistic regression results for bicycle trips using “Bike Lanes 
per Capita” as the infrastructure measure. The network effect proxy is the bike 
mode share of the excluded trip purpose. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




































































Leisure Trips Base  Base  Excluded Base  
Other Trips -0.243* 
(0.125) 
-0.242* 

























Sample Size 4,927 4,739 4,779 5,457 
- 2 Log-Likelihood 3,180.09 3,175.93 2,944.73 3,686.91 
*** significant at the 1-percent level 
**   significant at the 5-percent level 







Table 4.4(b): Binary logistic regression results for bicycle trips using “Bike 
Infrastructure Score” as the infrastructure measure. The network effect proxy is 
the bike mode share of the excluded trip purpose. 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 






































































Leisure Trips Base Base  Excluded Base 
Other Trips -0.184* 
(0.110) 
-0.177 

























Sample Size 5,819 5,564 5,675 6,444 
- 2 Log-Likelihood 3,981.92 3,827.32 3,678.07 4,455.02 
*** significant at the 1-percent level 
**   significant at the 5-percent level 








Table 4.5(a): Marginal effects for regressions (1) through (4). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Network Effects 0.5252 0.4622 0.6468 0.3393 
Bike Lanes per Capita 0.1029 0.0567 0.0861 0.0534 
Flat Topography 0.0423 0.0718 0.1395 0.1097 
Trip Length -0.0052 -0.0091 -0.0207 -0.0101 
Bad Weather -0.0467 -0.0393 -0.0469 -0.0453 
Work Trips Excluded 0.0331 0.0792 0.0343 
Educational Trips Excluded 0.0726 0.1087 0.0740 
Shopping Trips -0.0152 Excluded -0.0013 -0.0225 
Leisure Trips Base Base Excluded Base 
Other Trips -0.0243 -0.0261 Base Excluded 
Male 0.0268 0.0434 0.0279 0.0289 
Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000 















Table 4.5(b): Marginal effects for regressions (5) through (8). 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Network Effects 0.7201 0.4348 0.6494 0.3524 
Bike Infrastructure 
Score -0.0281 0.0278 0.0290 0.0344 
Flat Topography 0.1241 0.1034 0.1324 0.1204 
Trip Length -0.0066 -0.0097 -0.0210 -0.0111 
Bad Weather -0.0657 -0.0596 -0.0575 -0.0593 
Work Trips Excluded 0.0243 0.0711 0.0278 
Educational Trips Excluded 0.0605 0.1031 0.0644 
Shopping Trips -0.0165 Excluded -0.0036 -0.0211 
Leisure Trips Base Base Excluded Base 
Other Trips -0.0198 -0.0198 Base Excluded 
Male 0.0224 0.0420 0.0281 0.0236 
Age -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 














Table 4.6: Regression results for city-specific dummies as the dependent variable. 
 
 (1) (2) 




Network Effects  8.497*** 
(1.138) 








Sample size 17 17 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.86 
*** significant at the 1-percent level 
**   significant at the 5-percent level 

























While transportation planners were always aware of social network 
effects in transportation mode choice modeling, recently they have gained 
more interest for academic researchers. My three dissertation essays give 
further insight in both the theoretical foundation as well as the empirical 
analysis of social network effects in mode choice modeling.  
 In my first, more analytically oriented essay, I start out by developing a   
mode choice model with just one transportation mode, which I later extend to 
include a second, alternative mode. I describe social network effects as a 
coordination externality with the potential problem of having a Nash 
equilibrium that is not welfare maximizing. In this context I shed new light on 
the collapse of transit ridership in the United States after World War II. 
 The other two essays are econometric applications of social network 
effects. In the second essay, I investigate social network effects in transit 
ridership using travel behavior data from New York City. In the third essay, I 
explain bike mode share differences in German cities through social network 
effects. In both cases I had to deal with the problem of social network effects 
being endogenous. In the New York dataset, I resolved the issue by choosing 
to use a spatially autoregressive process for social network effects. For the 
German dataset, I decided to derive an instrument from records with excluded 
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trip purposes. Both models empirically indicate the existence of social network 
effects for transit use in New York and bicycling in Germany, respectively. 
 The main contribution of the dissertation, however, is to emphasize the 
importance of social network effects for transportation policy. This issue runs 
through all three essays like a red thread. In the theoretical essay, I establish 
the possibility that there exist multiple mode share equilibria, and that a city’s 
mode share is path-dependent. Hence, certain unique historical events may 
result in irreversible changes to transportation mode shares. Then, in the 
second essay, I show that ignoring social network effects may lead to an 
omitted variable bias, with the result of systematically overestimating 
suburban transit ridership, and underestimating transit ridership in the CBD. 
Finally, in my third essay, I contrast biking policies relying on infrastructure 
improvement with a policy approach that considers strengthening the city’s 
biking culture. 
 At the end of a research project, one always recognizes what could 
have been done better. This, of course, applies to my dissertation as well, 
which I interpret as a sign of successful learning. The two issues in need of 
further investigation would be the endogeneity of social network effects and 
the self-selection of residential location choice. A possible improvement for 
the first issue of endogeneity may be a simultaneous equation approach with a 
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linear probability model formulation, while a nested logit choice model could 
help to alleviate the second issue of self-selection. 
 I see this dissertation as the beginning of my research agenda, in laying 
the groundwork for the topic of social network effects in transportation mode 
choice modeling, which I will build upon. I plan to improve the modeling 
approaches by addressing the endogeneity and self-selection issues in future 
papers. 
 Another problem in these models is that residential location choice 
depends on transportation infrastructure. To complicate the issue, residential 
location choice, again, will depend on social network effects. While the 
Tiebout model does not explicitly include social network effects in such a way 
as it is modeled in my dissertation, voting by feet is an expression of social 
network effects. Hence, based on the methodological fundaments laid in my 
dissertation, it would be a challenging but also exciting exercise for me to 
improve present-day land-use and residential choice model by treating 
transportation infrastructure as endogenous and accounting for social network 
effects, as well. 
 Two similar fields of social network effects applications in urban and 
regional economics are immigration and fertility decision making. The two 
research areas are especially interesting for me as a German, coming from the 
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country with the lowest reproduction rate in the world and, therefore, more 
than ever dependent on immigration. Both these issues are inherently 
interlinked: It is expected that with the depopulation of German cities, some 
cities are in danger of collapse, while other cities may even continue to grow, 
mainly do to interregional as well as international immigration. As a sideline, I 
should mention that the cities currently growing also have a highest 
reproduction rate (and not rural areas). 
 I expect that the concept of social network effects with its many 
applications will become more important in future policy analysis. The 
revelation of the dynamic character inherent to social network effects will 
deepen the insight of any policy issue to be analyzed, and therefore strengthen 
the derived recommendations. Better access to improved modeling techniques 
will make empirical estimations of social network effects more operational for 
planners and consultants. 
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